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Abstract 
This paper seeks to determine if people’s religious affiliation matters in their propensity to act 
corruptly. Using a three-person one-shot sequential move corruption game, this paper finds 
that people internalize their religious beliefs to affect outcomes including acting corruptly. 
Consistent with findings by Flavin and Ledet (2010), this paper find Catholics to have a 
higher propensity to offer and accept bribes and be less likely to punish corruption culprits 
than protestants and muslims. This paper concludes that people’s religious affiliation matters 
in the fight against corruption. 
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1.0 Introduction 
 There is an increasing body of literature that shows that one’s religious beliefs impact 
on ones conduct and behavior (Flavin & Ledet, 2010). Using experimental methodology, this 
study sought to determine if one’s religiosity impacts on one’s willingness to offer or accept a 
bribe or punish those who engage in corruption. 
 The motivation for this paper is premised on a number of cross-country comparisons 
that have shown lower rates of corruption in countries with a higher percentage of the 
population that professes protestant Christian faith (see for example, Serra, 2006; Chang & 
Golden, 2004; Bonacich et al., 1976; Treisman, 2000). About 80% of the Kenya’s population 
profess christian faith. Kenya is also ranked among the most corrupt countries in the world.          
                                                             
1
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With a Corruption Perception Index (CPI)
2
of 2.1, Transparency International ranked Kenya 
as the 154
th
 least corrupt country out of 180 countries sampled (Transparency International, 
2010). Biblical teachings are against corruption and bribes. For example, 1 Samuel 8:3 
points to the fact that acceptance of a bribe perverts justice
3
. In Daniel 6:4, 
Daniel is commended for his trustworthiness and shunning of corruption
4
.This paper sought 
to determine if one’s stated religious affiliation has an impact on whether an individual offers 
or accept a bribe and whether the affiliation has an impact on one’s decision to punish those 
who engange in bribery. 
 This paper uses a one-shot sequential move corruption game to determine if people’s 
religious affiliation affects their propensity to act corruptly. The paper, consistent with 
findings in other research, found religious affiliation to matter. Specifically, a catholic 
manager and a catholic public official are more likely to offer and accept a bribe than their 
protestant counterparts respectively. A catholic citizen is less likely to punish corruption 
culprits than a protestant citizen. This paper concludes that people’s religious affiliation are 
internalized to affect indivial decisions including acting corruptly. 
 Following this introduction, the rest of the paper is organized as follows: section 2 
discusses the research methodology. Section 3 presents the results and the discussions while 
section 4 concludes the study. 
 
2.0 Research methodology 
 Many studies on corruption including the well-established CPI by Transparency 
International have relied mainly on survey data. Questions abound on the reliability of the 
findings of such research. The questions emanate from doubts as to whether people truthfully 
report their involvement in corruption. Three general concerns regarding survey data based 
on behavioral questions have been raised, which relate to "hypothetical bias", "idealized 
persona bias" and "incentive compatibility" (Carpenter, 2002). 
 To illustrate hypothetical bias, consider the likely response to the question "Would 
you ever accept a bribe offered to you?" An individual's response to this question can only be 
                                                             
2
Corruption Perception Index (CPI) combines information from different expert and business surveys on the 
perceived level of public-sector corruption in a country. The index ranges from 0 (most corrupt) to 10 (least 
corrupt). 
3
But his sons did not follow his ways. They turned aside after dishonest gain and accepted bribes and perverted 
justice. 
4
At this, the administrators and the satraps tried to find grounds for charges against Daniel in his conduct of 
government affairs, but they were unable to do so. They could find no corruption in him, because he was 
trustworthy and neither corrupt nor negligent 
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hypothetical and may not necessarily reflect what the individual would do if they were 
actually offered a bribe. The idealized persona bias can be illustrated by the response to the 
question "How many times in a week do you encounter situations in which a bribe is 
demanded from you?" A person answering this question may either respond on the basis of 
what he thinks the researcher wants to hear or in relation to the would like to be. The 
incentive compatibility issue with survey data arises from the fact that there is no incentive in 
survey research for the respondent to take the survey seriously (Bertrand & Mullainathan, 
2001). 
 The challenges with studying corruption using surveys are compounded by the 
secrecy of corruption involvement because of its illegality. Experiments then become a 
natural alternative in studying corruption. Laboratory experiments offer the possibility to 
overcoming unobservability of corrupt activity by generating data from a bribery game while 
controlling the environment and the characteristics of the subjects involved (Roth, 1998). In 
an experiment, a subject is confronted by a non-trivial amount of money and his final payoff 
is solely dependent on his actions in the experiment. The monetary reward acts as an 
incentive for the subject to reveal his type. To show the different results obtained from 
surveys and experiments, a number of studies have compared "measure of trust" findings 
from both survey and experiments ( see for example Glaeser et al., 2000; Burks et al., 2000; 
Ben-Ner & Puttermann, 1999). These studies find measures of trust from experiments to be 
largely uncorrelated with responses to survey questions designed to measure social capital. 
They find that respondents who indicate they are trusting do not exhibit this trust in an 
experiment with monetary stakes. 
 Similar discrepancies have emerged when findings from surveys and experiments on 
corruption are compared. Findings in two key surveys that show women to be less corrupt 
than men serve as a good example in this regard (see Dollar et al., 2001; Swamy et al., 2001). 
The findings of these two studies have been the basis for advocating the greater involvement 
of women in the public service. Most experiments on gender and corruption have, however, 
not found gender differences in corruption ( see for example Alatas et al., 2009a; Armantier 
& Boly, 2008; Frank & Lambsdorff, 2008)
5
.  
 The difference in the findings may be attributed to the difference in what the two sets 
of studies were investigating. For example, in one of the surveys that Swamy et al. (2001) 
                                                             
5
In contrast, other experimental studies have found gender differences in the propensity to act corruptly ( see 
Rivas, 2008, and Schulze & Frank, 2003). 
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conducted, the researchers examined responses to hypothetical questions on whether one can 
be justified for accepting a bribe in the line of their work. A larger percentage of women 
(77.3%) than men (72.3%) supported the statement that "someone accepting a bribe in the 
course of their duties can never be justified". However, the fact that a respondent does not 
think that accepting a bribe is justifiable does not mean that they would not act corruptly 
offered an actual bribe. 
 There is obviously a need for being cautious in interpreting experimental findings and 
their general application because conditions in a laboratory differ from those in the real world 
with all its complexity. The second reason for the caution is the fact that experiments mainly 
draw their subjects from students who are not a representative of the general population. List 
(2006) and Levitt and List (2007) have suggested the incorporation of field experiments to 
complement laboratory experiment findings. On this front, the evidence in relation to 
corruption is encouraging. Armantier and Boly (2008) conducted a bribery game combining a 
lab experiment in Montreal and a field experiment in Burkina Faso. While the study did not 
find any difference with regard to subjects acting opportunistically in both the laboratory and 
field set up, increasing the bribe amount was found to exacerbate corruption in the field set 
up but not in the laboratory situation
6
. 
 This paper adopts experimental games as a research methodology, first because of the 
novelty of the methodology in the Kenyan context, and secondly because all studies on 
corruption in Kenya have been based on surveys. Thus, not only will this work contribute to 
the existing work on corruption but it will also make a significant contribution in the use of 
experimental methodology in the Kenyan context. 
 
2.1 Corruption game with punishment 
 This experiment is adopted from Alatas et al. (2009a) and has been used in other 
studies ( see for example Waithima, 2010; Alatas et al., 2009b; Cameron et al., 2009). The 
                                                             
6
The experiment involved grading of exam papers where the 11th paper had some US$ Bills and a message 
stating "Please find few mistakes in my exam paper". To distinguish between laboratory and field experiment, 
subjects in the laboratory set up were informed that theywere involved in an experiment while those in the field 
set up were only made aware that they were in an experiment after they had graded the papers. 
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experiment engages three players in a one-shot
7
sequential-move game. These players are a 
manager of a firm (potential bribe-giver), a public official (potential bribee) and a citizen 
(potential punisher). The citizen is adversely affected by a corrupt act that privately benefits 
both the bribe giver and the bribee. Conceptually, the game is modeled on the corruption 
deterrence game by Schulze and Frank (2003) which had three players; the briber, bribee and 
those harmed by the corruption. The set-up mimics a corruption scenario in which two people 
benefit from a corrupt transaction at the expense of a third party external to the corrupt 
transaction. 
 The manager faces the choice to initiate the bribery transaction by offering a bribe to 
the public official who makes a decision on whether to accept or reject the bribe. If the public 
official accepts the bribe, both the manager's and the public official's payoffs increase at the 
expense of the citizen. The citizen moves last to make a decision on whether or not to punish 
both the manager and the public official. The punishment is at a cost to the citizen but the 
punishment imposes a much bigger monetary cost to the manager and the public official. The 
experiment has two treatments; in one, subjects revealed their gender while in the other they 
revealed their surnames. The gender or the surnames of the trio in relevant treatments in each 
session are displayed on each of the three computer screens. Displaying of the gender or the 
surnames ensures that the choices that the subjects make in the game can be seen as being 
motivated by either the gender or the ethnic composition of the trio. The figure that follows 
shows the extensive form of the game. 
 
                                                             
7The one-shot nature of the game is meant to eliminate any potential economic incentive 
for the citizen to punish. It also helps to avoid issues associated with repeated games such 
as signaling, reputation formation and serial correlation in decisions (Alatas et al., 2009a) 
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offer bribe
No bribe
Don't Accept Accept
Don't Punish
Punish
Manager
Public Official
Citizen
    
  
    
{Fm, Fpo, Fc}
{Fm-z, Fpo, Fc}
{Fm-z+2B, Fpo+2.5B, Fc-B}
{Fm-Z+2B-3P, Fpo+2.5B-4P, Fc-B-P}
Figure 1: Extensive form of the game 
MF , PO
F
 and C
F
 are the initial endowments for the manager, public official and citizen 
respectively. Z is the cost that the manager incurs to establish a bribery relationship. The 
bribe is of an amount B which benefits the manager by 2B and the public official by 2.5B; in 
addition, the bribe reduces the citizen’s payoff by B. For the manager and the public official, 
their payoffs are increasing in the bribe amount. The bribe amount is where  
and is respectively the minimum and maximum bribe amount allowable in the game if the 
manager chooses to offer a bribe. We assume that the citizen can observe the actions of the 
manager and the public official and has the option of punishing them or not. The punishment 
is valued at P, which reduces the manager’s payoff by 3P and public official’s payoff by 4P. 
The punishment amount is , where  and  are respectively the minimum and 
maximum punishment amount allowable in the game. For the three players, their payoffs are 
decreasing in the punishment amount. If the citizen chooses to punish, the final payoffs 
are ,  and  for the manager, public official 
and the citizen respectively. 
 Since by choosing to punish, the citizen reduces his/her payoff by the punishment 
amount, the theoretical prediction of this game is that he chooses not to punish culprits of 
corruption. Knowing the unwillingness of the citizen to punish, the manager will propose the 
highest allowable bribe amount  and the public official will accept it. Under the assumption 
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that all players are selfish and only care about their own monetary reward, the subgame 
perfect equilibrium payoffs are ,  and  for the manager, public 
official and the citizen respectively. In this game, if the citizen chooses to punish, such a 
decision is motivated purely by his or her intolerance towards corruption supporting findings 
of the third party punishment games
8
. Likewise, a manager who does not propose a bribe and 
a public official who does not accept a bribe will be because of their ethical and moral 
persuasion about corruption. This paper explores if one’s religious affiliation has an impact 
on the choice that each subject makes. 
 
2.2 Game Procedure 
 Advertisements for the recruitment of potential subjects were made by placing fliers 
on university notice boards. Those interested signed on the notice boards and were contacted 
by research assistants by phone who explained what the research was about and the venue 
and date of the experiments. On the experiment day, subjects assembled in a hall where the 
procedure of the experiments was explained by the principal researcher. In the explanation no 
mentioned was made to the effect that the research was about corruption. Instead subjects 
were told that they were going to take part in a research about human behavior and strategic 
moves with monetary rewards. After the explanation which was followed by a question and 
answer session, the subjects were randomly assigned to three groups. Each group was 
directed to a lecture room in which there was a research assistant and a computer. It was the 
responsibility of the research assistant to direct each subject to the computer each at a time 
and ensured that there was no interaction between a subject playing the game and those 
waiting for their turns. A subject played with two other anonymous subjects in the other 
lecture rooms. The position that a subject took was randomly determined by how fast each 
logged into the system. Instead of using manager, public official and citizen, each subject was 
informed that they were player one, two or three. At the start of each session, the software 
administrator would at random assign an initial endowment combination for the trio. The 
move made by each was common knowledge since each move was displayed on the screens 
of the other two computers.  
 Player one was informed that he or she could enhance his or her payoff by transferring 
some tokens from his or her initial endowment to player two. He or she was informed that 
upon player two’s acceptance, he or she would benefit by twice the transfer amount and 
                                                             
8 See Fehr & Gachter (2000) for a thorough exposition on third-party punishment games. 
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player two would benefit by two and a half times the transfer amount while player three’s 
payoff would be reduced by the transfer amount. Player two who observed every move that 
player one made was informed that upon accepting the transfer from player one, he or she 
would benefit by 2.5 times the transfer amount while player three’s payoff was going to 
reduce by the transfer amount. Both player one and two were informed that upon player one 
making a transfer and player two accepting, player three could decide to punish both of them 
and that a punishment of P amount would reduce player one’s payoff by 3 times while player 
two’s payoff would reduce by 4 times. Player three was able to observe the moves that player 
one and two made and was informed of the consequences that such moves would have on his 
or her payoff. Player three was informed that he or she had an option to punish both player 
one and two and the consequences that such punishment would have on each of the player’s 
payoff. Table 1 below shows payoffs for the three players at different scenario in the game. 
 
Table 1: Initial endowment, bribe and punishment amounts 
Combination Initial endowment Bribe Amount Punishment Amount 
 Manager 
(Player 
One) 
Public 
Official 
(Player 
Two) 
Citizen 
(Player 
Three) 
Minimum Maximum Minimum Maximum 
1 330 250 260 50 80 40 65 
2 200 180 190 50 80 40 65 
3 280 230 240 50 80 40 65 
4 240 190 180 50 80 40 65 
5 300 250 210 50 80 40 65 
6 290 280 270 50 80 40 65 
7 310 290 280 50 80 40 65 
8 305 300 280 50 80 40 65 
9 230 210 200 50 80 40 65 
10 260 280 280 50 80 40 65 
Note that initial endowment, bribe and punishment amount were set in such a way that no 
player would end up with zero or negative payoff.       
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 Each session of the game ended with subjects filling in an electronic questionnaire 
after which they were directed to a waiting room in order to rule out interaction with those 
who were waiting for their turn to play the game. When all had played the game, each was 
informed of their final payoff in form of tokens which were converted into Kenya shillings 
and paid out.  On average, each subject earned Ksh 290 (about 4 US$) which was considered 
an adequate compensation for the three hours
9
 spent.  
 
2.3 Subject pool 
 The experiments were conducted between October 2008 and May 2009 in various 
universities and colleges in Kenya. The universities and colleges
10
were selected in order to 
take into account the geographic and demographic diversity of the Kenyan population. In 
total, 15 universities and colleges located in the eight provinces in Kenya took part in the 
experiments. Table 2 presents the regional location of the universities and colleges as well as 
the demographic attributes of the sample. While the majority of the universities and colleges 
are government-funded, a few are privately owned. Private universities attract students from 
wealthier families than government-sponsored ones. On average, 67 subjects  in each centre 
took part in the experiments. 
 
Table2: Demographic summary statistics of the subject pool 
Aspect Category Number Percent 
Gender Male 
Female 
673 
339 
66.5 
33.5 
Age 18-30 
31-40 
41-50 
972 
34 
6 
96.0 
3.4 
0.6 
Religion Protestants 
Catholic 
Muslim 
Others 
699 
350 
47 
16 
69.1 
24.7 
4.6 
1.6 
Ethnic group Kikuyu 336 33.2 
                                                             
9
 This is the average time spent in the whole exercise. The experiments were conducted mainly on weekends to 
ensure that universities’ timetables were not disrupted.  
10
 In Kenya, there is a clear distinction between universities and colleges. While colleges offer diploma and 
certificate level programs, universities offer degree programs. 
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Kalenjin 
Luhya 
Kisii 
Luo 
Kamba 
Others 
142 
118 
108 
117 
95 
96 
14.0 
11.7 
10.7 
11.6 
9.4 
9.5 
University/ College 
Daystar Athi River 
Egerton 
Eldoret Polytechnic 
KIA (Nairobi) 
Maseno 
MasindeMurilo 
Kimathi Institute 
Moi 
KEMU 
UON (Lower Kabete) 
Daystar Nairobi 
NEP Intitute 
Mt. Kenya 
Mombasa Polytechnic 
Kabarak 
45 
64 
69 
42 
60 
51 
63 
93 
83 
39 
63 
93 
90 
66 
81 
4.4 
7.3 
6.8 
4.2 
5.9 
5.0 
6.2 
9.2 
8.2 
3.9 
6.2 
9.2 
8.9 
6.5 
8.0 
 
 Members of student governments in various universities and colleges as well posters 
placed on notice boards were used to recruit potential participants. Those who expressed 
interest in the experiments by signing up were contacted telephonically by a research 
assistant or the principal researcher encouraging them to participate in the experiment and to 
let their friends know about the experiments. They were also encouraged to raise whatever 
questions they might have about the experiments on the day of the experiments. A day before 
the experiments, those who had signed up were contacted telephonically to remind them of 
the experiments. 
 In most centres, about 75% of those who had indicated their willingness to participate 
showed up for the experiments. There were cases of students who had not signed up for the 
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experiments showing up on the day of the experiments. On the experiment day, the subjects 
gathered in a large hall. The principal researcher explained what the experiments were about 
and how they would be conducted. They were told that each subject would participate in two 
games. From the beginning, it was emphasized that there would not be any show-up payment 
and that each subject's final payment would be dependent on their actions in the two games 
they would take part in. After each subject had taken part in either the gender or the ethnicity 
treatment, they were directed to a waiting hall. 
 In total, 1012 students took part in the experiments. This number compares well with 
the 1326 subjects in the experiment of Alatas et al. (2009a). Of the 1012 students, 339 
(33.5%) were women. This number is small compared to gender balance in Kenyan 
universities and colleges where women form almost half of the population. The low female 
turn out may be attributed to the fact that the experiments were advertised as requiring 
computer skills. This explanation is inferred from the numerous questions on the level of 
computer skills required for the experiments from the potential female participants contacted. 
 
2.3.1 Subjects' attitudes and views on corruption in Kenya 
 At the end of each experiment, subjects were required to fill in an electronic 
questionnaire. A number of questions were designed to mainly elicit the subjects' attitudes 
and views on corruption in Kenya. Table 1 presents a summary of responses to some of the 
questions in the questionnaire. A high proportion of subjects (81.2%) indicated that 
corruption is a very serious problem in Kenya with a majority indicating that they 
encountered corruption cases several times in a week. On the question of where the subjects 
encountered corruption, evidently the majority of the subjects encountered corruption in 
government offices including police stations, hospitals and the offices of the provincial 
administration
11
. 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
                                                             
11
 Provincial administration is the lowest level of government that one interacts with most frequently especially 
for government licenses. 
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Table 1: Summary of subject views on the extent of corruption in Kenya 
Question Responses Percent 
How serious is 
corruption in Kenya? 
There is no corruption problem in Kenya 
Moderately serious 
Very serious 
0.9 
17.9 
81.2 
How frequently do you 
encounter corruption 
cases? 
Daily  
Once a month 
Once a week 
Several times a week 
Hardly 
28.8 
14.8 
8.6 
30.7 
17.1 
Where do you encounter 
corruption cases? 
Police 
Immigration officials 
Tax officials 
Land office 
Place of worship 
Universities and schools 
Hospitals 
Provincial administration 
Does not apply 
32.7 
7.3 
6.7 
4.9 
3.1 
18.2 
8.1 
15.9 
3.0 
Do you report corruption 
cases to the authorities? 
Yes 
No 
12.9 
87.1 
What is your 
justification for reporting 
or not reporting? 
Government is not committed to fight corruption 
It is a waste of time 
Fear of victimization 
Authorities do a good job 
30.1 
41.2 
21.2 
7.6 
Which among these are 
causes of corruption in 
Kenya? 
Ethnic diversity 
Lack of government commitment to fight it 
Poverty 
Income inequality 
16.4 
22.4 
22.8 
38.4 
 
 A considerable proportion (18.2%) reported having encountered corruption in 
universities and schools. These findings are similar to those reported in Transparency 
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International's Kenya Bribery Index Report (Transparency International, 2009) which 
reported increasing levels of corruption in academic institutions. 
 An overwhelming majority of respondents (87.1%) indicated that they did not report 
corruption cases. The majority (41.2%) considered reporting a waste of time while 30.1% 
indicated the reason for not reporting corruption to be the lack of government commitment to 
deal with corruption. A sizeable proportion indicated fear of victimization to be the reason for 
not reporting (21.2%). 
 Many of the subjects (38.4%) cited income inequalities to be the main cause of 
corruption while 16.4% indicated ethnic diversity to be a major cause of corruption in Kenya. 
The lack of government commitment to deal with corruption was seen by 22.4% of the 
subjects as one of the causes of corruption in Kenya. 
 The views on corruption expressed by the subjects in this sample compares well with 
a survey conducted by Kibwana et al. (1996) in which 83.8% of the 555 respondents 
indicated that corruption is a very serious problem in Kenya. The respondents in Kibwana's 
study indicated the main causes of corruption to be ineffective laws and poor political 
leadership (67.7%) and poverty (15.7%). A sizeable proportion (22.2%) indicated that they 
would not consider reporting cases of corruption to the authorities with 78.8% indicating that 
the government had no commitment to fight corruption, and 44.4% of the respondents 
indicated ethnic affinity to be a factor in fuelling corruption. 
 The responses from the current sample, that of Kibwana et al. (1996) and various 
reports by Transparency International are a confirmation of how rife corruption is in Kenya. 
 The findings also confirm the loss of faith by Kenyans in the government's 
commitment to fighting corruption. It is indeed the lack of commitment by the Kenyan 
government that led to the resignation of and eventual flee from Kenya by the permanent 
secretary in charge of governance and ethics; John Githongo (Wrong, 2009). 
 
3.0 Results 
Result one: Those affiliated to Catholicism are significantly more likely to offer a bribe than 
those affiliated to other faiths 
 Compared to those affiliated to the Christian protestant and Islamic faiths, those 
affiliated to Catholicism are significantly more likely to offer a bribe. As Table 4 shows, 
87.2% of the Catholics who played the role of a manager offered a bribe compared to 78.8% 
of the protestants 66.7% of the muslims. In both cases, the differences are significant at 8.6% 
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compared to protestants and 9.8% compared to muslims. Managers affiliated to Islamic faith 
are just as likely to offer a bribe as those affiliated to the protestant Christian faith. 
 
Table 4: The proportion of managers offering a bribe based on religious affiliation 
 
 
 
 
 
Proportion of the 
managers offering a 
bribe 
Male Female 
0.812 0.79 
[0.615] 
Protestants Catholics 
0.788 0.872 
[0.086]
* 
Protestants Muslims 
0.788 0.667 
[0.388] 
Catholics Muslims 
0.872 0.667 
[0.098]
* 
Figures in parenthesis are Z-values. 
*
denotes significance at the 
10%level 
 
 
 
Result two: There are no gender differences in the probability to offer a bribe 
 As indicated in Table 4, male managers are just as likely to offer a bribe as their 
female counterparts. Introducing other factors that may have an impact on the probability to 
offer a bribe reveals that male managers are significantly more likely to offer a bribe than 
their female counterparts. 
 
Result three: There is no religious difference in the propensity to accept a bribe 
 The decision to accept or reject a bribe by a public official is purely opportunistic and 
is not influenced by his or her religious affiliation. These comparisons are presented in Table 
5. Column (2) of Table 7 shows that a Catholic public official is significantly more likely to 
accept corruption culprits than a protestant one. Female public officials are significantly more 
likely to accept a bribe than their male counterparts. 
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Table 5: The proportion of the public officials accepting a bribe based on religious 
affiliation 
 
 
 
 
 
Proportion of the 
public officials 
accepting a bribe 
Male Female 
0.701 0.682 
[0.747] 
Protestants Catholics 
0.685 0.722 
[0.558]
 
Protestants Muslims 
0.685 0.615 
[0.604] 
Catholics Muslims 
0.722 0.615 
[0.437]
 
Figures in parenthesis are Z-values 
 
 In some earlier analysis of this data, the decision to accept or reject a bribe by the 
public officials was found to be driven by the initial endowment and the size of the bribe 
offered. Specifically, the analysis showed that the higher a public official’s endowment, the 
more likely they were to reject a bribe (see Waithima, 2010a; Waithima, 2010b).Similar 
results are summarized in Table 7. Column (2) of Table 7 shows a negative relationship 
between the probability to accept a bribe and the size of the bribe and the endowment 
amount. 
 
Result four: There is no religious difference in the propensity to punish corruption culprits 
 There is no religious group that is more likely to punish corruption culprits than the 
other.  The comparisons are summarized in Table 6. Column (3) of Table 7 shows probit 
regression results on the probability of a citizen to punish corruption culprits. When other 
factors are taken into account, the results show that a Catholic citizen is significantly less 
likely to punish corruption culprits than a protestant citizen. A muslim citizen is also less 
likely to punish corruption culprits than a protestant one. Interestingly, the results show that a 
higher bribe will increase the probability of a citizen punishing corruption culprits. A female 
citizen is less likely to punish corruption culprits as compared to their male counterparts. 
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Table 6: The proportion of citizens willing to punish corruption  
 
 
 
 
 
Proportion of citizens 
willing to punish 
corruption culprits 
Male Female 
0.646 0.714 
[0.344] 
Protestants Catholics 
0.683 0.667 
[0.687]
 
Protestants Muslims 
0.683 0.667 
[0.917] 
Catholics Muslims 
0.649 0.667 
[0.919]
 
Figures in parenthesis are Z-values 
 
 
Table 7: Probit regressions on the probability of offering, accepting and punishing 
corruption culprits 
 (1) 
Prob (offer) 
(2) 
Prob (accept) 
(3) 
Prob (punish) 
Gender 0.021 [0.047] 0.012 [0.061] -0.069 [0.072] 
Bribe - -0.112 [0.127] 0.119 [0.072] 
endowment 0.157 [0.128] -0.241 [0.124] -0.240 [0.214] 
Catholic 0.088 [0.045] 0.039 [0.063] -0.029 [0.089] 
Muslim -0.095 [0.152] -0.061 [0.137] -0.029 [0.166] 
Number of observations 338 272 189 
The coefficients are marginal effects and the figures in parentheses are standard errors. A 
protestant subject is used as the base in all the regressions. 
 
4.0 Conclusion 
 Religious affiliation seems to matter in an individual’s propensity to act corruptly. 
Specifically, a Catholic manager and public official is more likely to offer and accept a bribe 
than their protestant counterparts respectively. A Catholic citizen is less likely to punish 
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corruption culprits than a protestant citizen. This finding is consistent with the finding by 
Flavin and Ledet (2010) who find USA states with a higher proportion of the population 
professing Catholics to have higher levels of government corruption. This paper concludes 
that people’s religious affiliation matters in the fight against corruption. 
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